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T heorists in the tradition of either Classical Marxism or Keynes­
ianism understand that as capitalism provides an historical 
space for the development of material forces of production, its eco­
nomic and social contradictions tend to develop, requiring progres­
sively more complex institutional structures and increasingly high­
er degrees of state intervention.
Since the 1970’s, many in the Marxist tradition have studied the 
relationship between long waves and changes in capitalist institu­
tions. A common theme of the literature is that the resolution of 
major crises of accumulation has historically required the construc­
tion and consolidation of new capitalist institutions with changing 
roles for the state (among others, see Aglietta, 1979; Mandel, 1983; 
Lipietz, 1987; Itoh, 1988; Dumenil & Levy, 1993; Arrighi, 1994; Ar- 
righi & Silver, 1999; Dumenil & Levy, 2001).
The “social structures of accumulation” (SSA) school has led in 
the study of long waves and institutional changes in the U.S. con­
text. According to the SSA school, the U.S. economy has passed 
through three social structures of accumulation over the past 150 
years. In the past, the direction of institutional changes has been 
towards a more interventionist state. However, the neoliberal era 
has been characterized by attempts to reverse the previous histori­
cal trend (Gordon, Edwards & Reich, 1982; Kotz, 1987; 2001; 
Bowles & Edwards, 1993).
Immanuel Wallerstein, the leading world-systems theorist, ar­
gues that states in the modern world-system have been under grow­
ing pressure from workers as well as capitalists to deliver increas-
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ingly more expensive services, and the inherent contradictions of 
the system have led to secular tendencies of rising taxation costs as 
well as rising wage and environmental costs. As these secular trends 
approach their asymptotic limits, the existing world-system is con­
fronted with an insoluble structural crisis.
These theoretical propositions raise important empirical ques­
tions: as the state plays changing and increasingly important roles 
in capitalist development, has the financing of state activities (taxa­
tion costs) become increasingly expensive? Has the rise of taxation 
costs led to the fall of the profit rate? What have been the effects of 
the neoliberal regime on taxation costs and the profit rate? What 
could be the long-term implications for the existing social system if 
the secular trend of rising taxation costs cannot be reversed?
In this article we present a new measurement of the profit rate 
in the U.S. economy for the period 1869-2000 that takes into ac­
count the movement of taxation costs. The results allow us to have 
some new understanding of the secular trends and long waves of 
capitalist development. The article begins with an examination of 
alternative theoretical approaches on the historical trends of capi­
talism and the changing role of the state: Marx and Engels, Keynes, 
the SSA school, and Wallerstein.
It then moves to examine the profit rate in the U.S. economy 
over the period 1869-2000. We find that the profit rate had tended 
to fall over the long period from the 1870’s to the 1980’s, followed 
by a small reversal in the neoliberal era. Rising taxation costs had 
played a major role in the fall of the profit rate. We are able to iden­
tify four long waves in the movement of the profit rate. Currently we 
are probably near the peak of the fourth (neoliberal) long wave.
SECULAR TRENDS, LONG WAVES, AND THE 
CHANGING ROLE OF THE STATE: MARX, ENGELS,
KEYNES, THE SSA SCHOOL, AND WALLERSTEIN
Classical Marxism :
A central and particularly insightful argument of Classical Marx­
ism is that all social systems are historical in the sense that they 
emerge and develop under certain historical conditions. As the 
underlying historical conditions tend to change, the existing social
system enters a period of crisis that is eventually resolved by the 
formation of a new social system.
For Marx and Engels the dynamic interactions between the un­
derlying historical conditions and the prevailing social system are 
driven by the contradiction between the material forces of pro­
duction and the social relations of production. Particular social re­
lations of production dominate during certain historical periods 
because they can broadly accommodate the development of produc­
tive forces. Over time, however, as the forces of production tend to 
develop, the existing social relations of production become increas­
ingly obstacles to this development, and are eventually replaced by 
a new set of social relations (Marx, 1958).
Capitalism, as a historically specific social system, is not an ex­
ception. But how exactly does the contradiction tend to develop 
under capitalist conditions? In Capital, volume III, Marx advanced 
the famous hypothesis “the law of the tendency for the rate of prof­
it to fall.” According to Marx, the development of productive 
forces under capitalism tends to be accompanied by the substitu­
tion of living labor by dead labor (that is, a rising capital-output 
ratio). Since surplus value (the capitalist profit) is produced by liv­
ing labor, this falling ratio leads to the fall of the profit rate. For 
Marx, the tendency for the rate of profit to fall in the long run 
would undermine the vitality of capital accumulation and deprive 
capitalism of its historical justification.
The validity of the hypothesis of falling rate of profit has been 
intensely debated among Marxist economists. The available empiri­
cal evidence suggests that the hypothesis of rising capital-output 
ratio has been largely consistent with the long-term historical ex­
perience of advanced capitalist economies. Foley and Marquetti’s 
study (2003) of 126 countries over the period of 1959-90 finds that 
capitalist economic development has been characterized by strong 
negative correlations between output-capital ratio and labor pro­
ductivity (implying that capital-output ratio tends to rise). However, 
the U.S. experience since the late nineteenth century has been a 
major exception. Over the past century, the U.S. capital-output ra­
tio has experienced some major upward and downward move­
ments that have largely offset each other. Table 1 presents the 
long-term movement of capital-output ratios in some advanced cap­
italist countries.
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Table 1
, Long-Term Movement of Capital-Output Ratios in 
Advanced Capitalist Economies 
(The ratio of gross nonresidential capital stock to gross domeslic product)
Y ear U.S. France Germ any Netherlands U.K. Jap an
1820 0.95 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.68 n.a.
1890 3.05 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.83 0.71
1913 3.30 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 .84 0.89
1950 2.45 1.63 1.81 2.06 0.81 1.77
1973 2.12 1.55 1.94 1.97 1.32 1.74
1992 2.43 2 .26 2.33 2.31 1.82 3.02
Source: Maddison, 1995: 36.
In Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Engels characterized the ba­
sic contradiction of capitalism as one between the increasing so­
cialization of the “means of production and production itself’ and 
“a form of appropriation which presupposes the private produc­
tion of individuals” (1958: 139-40). The contradiction, first of all, 
finds expression in the conflict between the two antagonistic class­
es, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In The Communist Manifesto, 
Marx and Engels believed that “the advance of industry” would 
create increasingly favorable conditions for the development and 
organization of the working class, undermining “the very founda­
tion” on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates prod­
ucts (2004).
Secondly, the contradiction finds expression in the conflict be­
tween the organized, planned production within capitalist firms 
and the general conditions of “anarchy of production” prevailing 
in the capitalist economy as a whole. The conflict results in increas­
ingly more violent crises of over-production, forcing capitalism to 
adopt new forms of organization that are of increasingly higher 
degrees of “socialization.” These include stock-holding companies 
and monopolistic organizations, such as cartels and trusts. Engels 
believed that “the official representative of capitalist society—the 
state—will ultimately have to undertake the direction of produc­
tion” (1958: 147), preparing the material and institutional condi­
tions for the future socialist transition.
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Keynes
For Keynes and the contemporary economists who follow 
Keynes’ tradition (mainly post-Keynesians), a free market capitalist 
economy with a small government is fundamentally unstable, prone 
to frequent and violent crises with severe social consequences.
As capitalism develops, investment in expensive, long-lasting 
fixed capital assets tends to grow in importance. Keynes argues 
that investment in fixed capital suffers from fundamental uncer­
tainty and the prospective yields on fixed capital in the future can­
not be meaningfully calculated in rational manners. As a result, the 
size and structure of investment largely depend on individual inves­
tors’ psychological conditions, what Keynes called “the animal spir­
its.” As investment becomes a growing part of the output, the capi­
talist economy tends to become increasingly unstable, subject to 
sudden and violent fluctuations.
In Keynes’ opinion, the development of organized capital mar­
kets is more likely to be under the influence of speculation than 
direct investment into socially useful channels. As a growing pro­
portion of the society’s capital is owned by people, “who do not 
manage and have no special knowledge of the circumstances, ei­
ther actual or prospective, of the business in question,” the average 
investors are further detached from any real understanding of busi­
ness conditions (Keynes, 1964: 153-59).
Keynes’ prescription was for the state to play a major role in 
stabilizing a capitalist economy, through “somewhat comprehen­
sive socialization of investment” (1964: 378). The state must take a 
“position to calculate the marginal efficiency of capital goods on 
long view and on the basis of the general social advantage, taking 
an ever greater responsibility for directly organizing investment” 
(1964: 164).
Theorists following Keynes’ tradition have continued to em­
phasize the importance of the state as a regulator of capitalist con­
tradictions. Hyman Minsky, for example, sees financial instability 
as arising from the internal operations of capitalism itself. A long 
period of stability and rising prosperity, Minsky claims, “breeds a 
view in ordinary business corporations and financial institutions 
which allows them to raise their short-term payment commitments 
as a ratio . . .  to their expected cash flows from operations” (Minsky, 
1982: 186-87). This profit-seeking behavior leads to higher debt-
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income ratios and more fragile financial structures. Minsky argues 
that comprehensive government regulations of the financial system 
and a sufficiently large government sector (comparable in size to 
private investment) are essential conditions for the normal opera­
tions of modern capitalist economy (1982; 1986). •
Long Waves and Social Structures of Accumulation
The “social structures of accumulation” (SSA) school has led in 
the study of long waves and stages of capitalist development in the 
U.S. context. According to the SSA school, at each stage of capital­
ist development, a certain set of political, economic, and social in­
stitutions forms a social structure of accumulation. As long as the 
existing SSA provides a favorable environment for capital accumu­
lation by ensuring relatively high and stable profit rates, the capital­
ist economy tends to expand vigorously. However, over time, due 
to changing economic and social conditions as well as contradic­
tions within the existing SSA, the profit rate tends to decline, un­
dermining accumulation, and eroding the existing SSA, resulting in 
“a period of decay” characterized by economic stagnation or con­
traction, and intensified social conflicts. During the period of decay, 
the social groups and political forces defending the declining SSA 
tend to be weakened, and various classes and social groups will 
fight for the direction of institutional change until a new SSA 
emerges (Gordon et al., 1982; Kotz, 1987; Bowles & Edwards, 1993: 
120-24, 440-73).
According to the SSA school, the U.S. economy has passed 
through three social structures of accumulation (long waves) over 
the past 150 years. The first, competitive capitalist SSA lasted from 
the 1840’s to the 1890’s. The second, private monopoly capitalist 
SSA lasted from the turn of the nineteenth century to the 1930’s. 
The post-Second World War SSA started in the 1940’s and its ex­
pansionary stage ended in the mid-1970’s. There has been debate 
within the SSA school concerning whether the neoliberal stage of 
capitalism constitutes an independent SSA.
Kotz notes that in each previous SSA the direction of institu­
tional reconfiguration has been towards a more interventionist 
state (2001). In the neoliberal era, however, increased global inter­
dependence has limited the ability of individual states to regulate 
capital. While a new SSA requires a state that can intervene in the
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capitalist economy in new and more effective ways, the neoliberal 
policies run counter to the requirement for developing a regula- 
tionist state. As a result, a new SSA has failed to emerge and eco­
nomic stagnation and instability has continued.
In a later article, Kotz argues that the historical pattern of long- 
run capital accumulation can be better understood as based on suc­
cessive institutional structures that may or may not be social struc­
tures of accumulation (that is, they may or may not promote capital 
accumulation) (2004). Inspired by Karl Polanyi, he suggests that U.S. 
capitalism has alternated between liberal institutional structures and 
regulationist institutional structures, with the excesses and contradic­
tions of each phase setting the stage for transition to the next, oppo­
site phase.
Over the past century, U.S. capitalism has experienced two reg­
ulationist institutional structures and two liberal institutional struc­
tures. The progressive era regulationist institutional structure last­
ed from 1900-16; the post-First World War liberal institutional 
structure lasted from 1920-32; the post-Second World War regula­
tionist institutional structure lasted from 1947-73; and the neolib­
eral institutional structure started in 1980.
Kotz’s reconceptualization of capitalist institutional evolution 
raises the interesting question whether capitalism will swing back 
towards some form of regulationist institutional structure as the 
contradictions of neoliberialism develop.
Wallerstein’s World-Systems Approach
Immanuel Wallerstein and other world-systems analysts have 
followed the Classical Marxist tradition, seeing capitalism as an his­
torical system. According to Wallerstein, the internal contradic­
tions of the system find expressions in cyclical rhythms as well as 
secular trends. The cyclical rhythms serve to contain the contradic­
tions and preserve the basic structure of the system. These move­
ments, however, produce “small, structural shifts” which in turn 
generate secular trends that shift the structural parameters of the 
system itself (Wallerstein, 1997). Eventually, the system is no longer 
able to contain the pressure of the secular trends and enters a 
period of transition that will lead to its eventual demise.
Capitalism as a system is premised upon the endless accumula­
tion of capital. Three secular trends arise as a result of the drive
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towards endless accumulation. First, Wallerstein believes that there 
is a secular tendency towards the worldwide increase in the bar­
gaining power of workers and a consequent increase in the global 
wage bill for capital. He argues that workers tend to organize them­
selves and gain greater political strength over time, leading to high­
er levels of real wages as a percentage of costs of production. Capi­
tal responds to this by relocating to other areas of the globe where 
workers are less organized and wages are lower. But sooner or later 
the workers in the low-wage areas also start to organize and exert 
pressures on wage levels. Eventually the global expansion of capital 
will exhaust all possible sites of relocation, leading to the first of 
what Wallerstein terms “asymptotes” that signals the terminal crisis 
of the system (Wallerstein, 1998: 35-41).
The second limiting asymptote is the increase in the tax bill for 
capitalists. According to Wallerstein, there are two forces pushing 
for expansion of state activities. The first, is the pressure from capi­
tal itself for increasing state intervention to promote capital accu­
mulation and protect capitalist property relations, and the second 
is the pressure from popular demands for greater provisions of so­
cial welfare. The expansion of these provisions has been necessary 
to ensure political stability and to tame the “dangerous classes” 
(Wallerstein, 1998: 43). However, the increase in state activities has 
to be financed by higher tax revenue, wThich erodes profitability. 
Therefore, in the long run the second asymptote is reached when 
demands for increased state services interfere seriously with the 
possibility of accumulating capital.
The third limiting asymptote identified by Wallerstein is the 
“exhaustion of the conditions of survival” (1998: 44) that results 
from damage to the earth’s biosphere. Until very recently, capital­
ism has been able to “externalize” the environmental costs gener­
ated by the drive towards endless accumulation. What this repre­
sents, according to Wallerstein, is the shifting of “costs from the 
producer to the state or ‘society’ at large, thereby significantly in­
creasing the rate of profit of the producer” (1998: 45). However, 
the biosphere has now deteriorated to such a point that the very 
survival of humanity is at stake. The environmental costs thus can 
no longer be easily externalized and capital must either pay for 
them directly through reduced profits, or indirectly through the 
tax bill (1998: 45). '
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Following from these asymptotic limits, Wallerstein identifies a 
growing and unsustainable contradiction in the role of the state. On 
the one hand, capital needs the state more than ever before, as a 
provider of ever more complex services and to deal with growing 
environmental problems. On the other hand, the necessary increase 
in taxes that results from this demand leads to profit squeeze on 
capital itself. The inability of the state to meet the system’s require­
ments intensifies the malfunctioning of the system and undermines 
the legitimacy of the state itself. The vicious circle heralds the struc­
tural crisis of the existing world-system and Wallerstein argues that 
we are in the transition from the current world-system to one or 
several other systems (Wallerstein, 1998: 48).
Each of the theoretical traditions discussed above points to the 
increasing importance of the state as an historical tendency of capi­
talist development. The Marxist approach sees this as a necessary 
corollary of the contradiction between the increasing socialization 
of the productive forces and the capitalist relations of production. 
The Keynesian approach sees the state playing a crucial role in sta­
bilizing the capitalist economy as investment in fixed capital be­
comes more important. The SSA literature identifies a tendency 
towards growing state intervention (up to the rise of neoliberalism) 
from the institutional evolution of U.S. capitalism. Wallerstein 
points out that over time the state in the existing world-system has 
been under growing pressure from both capital and the general 
population to provide increasingly comprehensive services. To the 
extent that growing state activities have to be financed, the costs of 
taxation are likely to become a growing burden on capital accumu­
lation.
These are important theoretical propositions that need to be 
evaluated in the light of empirical evidence. The next section of this 
article attempts to address the question by examining the long-term 
movement of the profit rate and its determinants in the U.S. econ­
omy from 1869-2000.
LONG-TERM MOVEMENT OF THE PROFIT RATE AND ITS 
DETERMINANTS (THE U.S. ECONOMY, 1869-2000)
Marxists have always emphasized the profit rate as a key con­
cept in political economy. The capitalist system is based on produc­
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tion for profit. The profit rate is the central indicator that moti­
vates capital accumulation. Since the 1970’s, many have studied the 
movement of the profit rate and its determinants (such as the 
profit share or the rate of surplus value, the capital-output ratio or 
the organic composition of capital) in advanced capitalist countries 
during the post-Second World War period (among others, see 
Gordon, Weisskopf & Bowles, 1987; Armstrong, Glyn 8c Harrison, 
1991; Moseley, 1991; 1997; Shaikh & Tonak, 1994; Brenner, 1998; 
Shaikh, 1999). However, there have been few studies of the move­
ment of the profit rate and the profit share over longer periods.
Dumenil and Levy advanced a pioneering study of the long­
term movement of the rate of profit, the profit share, and capital 
productivity in the U.S. private economy (1993; 2001; 2002). They 
find that during two historical phases, from the Civil War to the 
beginning of the twentieth century, and from the 1940’s to the 
1970’s, technical change had led to falling capital productivity (that 
is, rising capital-output ratio) and falling rate of profit (what Du­
menil and Levy refer to as technical change “a la Marx”), resulting 
in “structural crisis.” However, in response to the crisis, capitalism 
underwent institutional changes that brought about “managerial 
revolution” and restored the profit rate more or less to previous 
levels. Dumenil and Levy also find that in the long run, the profit 
share and the wage share of output have been essentially constant.
Dumenil and Levy’s study uses a broad measure of profit that 
does not take into account the effect of taxation costs. The ap­
proach can be justified if one is interested in how national output 
is broadly distributed between the working class and the capitalist 
class (private capitalists and the capitalist state). But the approach 
would seem to be inadequate if one is interested in the actual rate 
of return on capital for private capitalists and the actual portion of 
output that is potentially available for capital accumulation. From 
private capitalists’ point of view, wages as well as taxes are “costs” 
that have to be subtracted from the revenue before a profit can be 
made, even though both types of “costs” occur to provide essential 
conditions for capitalist activities.
The rate of profit is the ratio of the profit to the stock of capital. 
The rate of profit can be written as the product of its two determi­
nants: the profit share and the output-capital ratio:
Rate of Profit = P /K  = (P /Y ) * (Y/K )
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Where P = profit, Y = output, K = Capital Stock.
We measure the output by the net domestic product and the 
capital stock by the net stock of private nonresidential fixed assets. 
We define the profit as the difference between output and the sum 
of wage and taxation costs. The wage costs include compensation 
of employees and an estimated wage component of the proprie­
tors’ income. The taxation costs are the sum of indirect taxes (less 
subsidies) and corporate income tax. All variables are measured in 
current dollars. Detailed discussions of data source and construc­
tion are presented in the appendix.1
Figure 1 shows the profit rates and their ten-year moving aver­
ages for the U.S. economy from 1869-2000.2 One can identify four 
long waves in the movement of the profit rate. If a long wave can 
be defined as from one trough point of ten-year moving averages 
to the next, then the first long wave started from some years before 
1869, reaching a peak around 1882, and bottomed in 1897. The 
second long wave started around the turn of century, rising to a 
high plateau between 1913-29, crashed during the Great Depres­
sion and bottomed in 1940. The third long wave started in the 
1940’s. The boom during the Second World War was followed by 
the “golden age” from 1945 to 1973, with a peak around 1966-68. 
The profit rate drifted down during the 1970’s and bottomed in 
1982. The period of 1869-97 probably included about three quar­
ters of a long wave, or 28 years. The second long wave lasted 43 
years and the third long wave lasted 42 years. The fourth long wave 
started in the mid-1980’s and might have reached the beginning of 
a high plateau by the late 1990’s.
1 The profit as measured in this article should not be confused with the Marxist 
concept of “surplus value,” which can be measured by the difference between the net 
value of output and the wages of production workers (Moseley, 1991; Shaikh & Tonak, 
1994). For the same reason, the profit share as measured in this article should not be 
seen as reflective of the rate of surplus value. The measure of taxation costs does not 
include income and wealth taxes on individual capitalists. However, the existing in­
come and wealth tax data do not tell us in what proportion these taxes are distributed 
between the capitalists and the workers and there is not a technique that helps us to 
reasonably estimate the proportion. As a result, the measure of taxation costs used in 
this article understates the actual level of taxation costs and possibly underestimates 
the extent to which the taxation costs have risen relative to output (considering that 
income taxes have grown in importance over the past century).
1869 is the year when many important U.S. national statistics begin to be avail­
able. 2000 is chosen as the ending year because it was the last year of the 1990’s ex­
pansion.
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Figure 1
The Profit Rate: U.S. Economy 1869-2000
f ■■ '"Profit Rate Rate-10 Year Ave !
In terms of periodization, these profit rate long waves corre­
spond closely to the successive “social structures of accumulation” 
discussed in the SSA literature. The first, second, and third long 
wave correspond respectively to the competitive capitalist, private 
monopoly capitalist, and state monopoly capitalist SSA. The de­
cline or the crisis of each of the three long waves coincided with a 
major institutional restructuring that produced a new SSA. We are 
now probably near the peak of the fourth, neoliberal long wave. If 
past history could serve as a guide, the current long wave is likely 
to enter its decline or crisis stage in the next ten years.
Figure 2 shows the profit shares and their ten-year moving av­
erages for the U.S. economy from 1869-2000. The profit share had 
clearly tended to fall from the 1870’s to the 1980’s. The ten-year 
average profit share fell from 28.4% during 1869-78 to 14.1% dur­
ing 1973-82, or by 50 percent.
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Figure 2
The Profit Share: U.S. Econom yl869-2000
Profit Share Share-10 Year Ave (
Table 2 reports the average and the peak profit rate and profit 
share for each of the four long waves. Each long wave is given a 
name that attempts to capture its institutional features. Both the 
profit rate and the profit share, measured by either the average for 
the entire stage (long wave) or by the peak ten-year average, had 
moved progressively lower from the first, competitive capitalist 
long wave to the third, state monopoly capitalist long wave. The 
long-term downward movements of the profit rate and the profit 
share seem to have been (at least temporarily) stopped and re­
versed during the neoliberal capitalist long wave. Both the profit 
rate and the profit share in the neoliberal era have risen above the 
levels found during the state monopoly capitalist long wave. Over­
all, during the post-Second World War period, both the profit rate 
and the profit share had stayed at levels significantly below those 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century and consid­
erably below those in the nineteenth century.
Figure 3 shows the output-private capital ratios and their ten- 
year moving averages, a measure related to the organic composi­
tion of capital. During the period 1869-2000, the output-capital 
ratio exhibited some major movements over certain periods but 
had essentially moved around a slightly upward trend. Therefore, 
the long-term decline of the profit rate is entirely accounted for by 
the decline of the profit share.
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Table 2
» The Profit Rate, the Profit Share, and Long Waves
Stage / 
Long Wave
Average for the phase Peak 10-year average 
(Peak year)





































The Output-Capital Ratio: U.S. Economy 1869-2000
" What had contributed to the decline of the profit share and the 
profit rate? ;
o l
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Figure 4 compares the wage costs, the taxation costs, and the 
sum of wage and taxation costs as share of output. Table 3 reports 
the average levels of wage costs, taxation costs, and their sum as 
share of output. Between the first and the third long wave, both 
the wage costs and the taxation costs had tended to increase as 
share of output. However, taxation costs clearly had accounted for 
the greater part of the increase in the total costs. Between the first 
and the third long wave, while the share of wage costs had in­
creased by 3.4 percentage points, the share of taxation costs had 
increased by 7.8 percentage points, more than double the increase 
of the wage costs. In the neoliberal era, the share of taxation costs 
fell by about 2 percentage points compared to the previous long 
wave. Despite this reversal, both the wages costs and the taxation 
costs as share of output have stayed at relatively high levels.
Figure 4
Wage Costs and Taxation Costs: U.S. Economy 1869-2000
Wage and Taxes Share .
The long wave studies have traditionally used the growth rate 
of real economic output as a major indicator of periodization.
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Table 3
Wage Costs, Taxation Costs, and Long Waves
Stage / L o n g  
Wave
W age costs /  
output
Taxation  costs /  
output




( 1 8 6 9 - 9 7 )
6 8 .5 % 6.1% 74 .6 %
Monopoly
Capitalism
( 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 4 0 )
6 9 .4 % 8.6% 78 .0%
State M onopoly
Capitalism
( 1 9 4 1 - 8 2 )
71 .9% 13.9% 8 5 .7 %
Neoliberal
Capitalism
( 1 9 8 3 - 2 0 0 0 )
71 .9% 11.8% 83 .7%
Source: U.S. D epartm ent o f  C o m m e rce  1975 ,  various tables; B EA  2 0 0 4 ,  vari­
ous tables.
Figure 5 compares the profit rates and their ten-year moving 
averages (for the U.S. economy, 1869-2000) with the growth rates 
of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and their ten-year moving 
averages (for the U.S. economy, 1871-2000).3 The growth rates 
fluctuate strongly from year to year and their long-term cyclical 
movements are not as pronounced as those for the profit rates. 
Nevertheless, some significant trough years can be identified: 1894, 
1917, 1933, 1954, and 1983. Each growth rate long cycle (measured 
from one trough year to the next) lasts between 15-30 years. Each 
profit rate long w7ave encompasses approximately two growth rate 
long cycles.
Table 4 reports the growth performance of the four profit-rate 
long waves. For the second, third, and fourth long waves, the aver­
age growth rates are calculated in two different ways, first over the 
profit-rate long wave itself, and secondly, over a period that cor­
rects for the effect of war, depression, or major recession. The 
growth performance of neoliberal capitalism is significantly worse
9 The growth rate data for 1930-2000 arc from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (2005: table 1.1. 1) and for 1871-1929 are from Maddison ( 1995:182 table C- 
16a).
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than that of competitive capitalism or state monopoly capitalism, 
and is roughly comparable to that of monopoly capitalism if either 
the Great Depression is excluded from the monopoly capitalist 
long wave or the 1980-82 recession is included in the neoliberal 
long wave.
Figure 5
The Profit Rate and Growth Rate:
U.S. Economy 1869-2000/1871-2000
Year
'Profit Rate ------ Growih Rale •®*®*Profii Rate-10 Yr Ave ^^ ^^ •Growth Rate-10 Yr Ave
Table 4
Long Waves and Growth Performance
Stage /  L ong Wave Average annual growth  
rate o f  real GDP (%)
Competitive Capitalism 1 8 7 1 - 9 7 3 .86
Monopoly Capitalism
1 8 9 8 - 1 9 4 0 3 .08
1 8 9 8 - 1 9 2 9 3 .59
State M onopoly  
Capitalism
1 9 4 1 - 8 2 3 .92
1 9 4 8 - 7 9 3 .7 7
Neoliberal Capitalism
1 9 8 3 - 2 0 0 0 3.61
1 9 7 9 - 2 0 0 0 3 .1 0
Source: U.S. D epartm ent o f  C o m m e rce  1975 ,  various tables; B E A  2 0 0 4 ,  vari­
ous tables.
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The state has always played an indispensable role in regulating 
capitalist class relations and providing favorable conditions for cap­
ital accumulation. As the economic and social contradictions of 
capitalism tend to grow, its successful operation has required pro­
gressively higher degrees of state intervention.
However, to finance the increasingly more extensive state ac­
tivities, the state has to impose greater taxation costs on the capital­
ist economy. Higher taxation costs, as well as higher wage costs, 
have eroded profitability and become a growing threat to the vi­
ability of the capitalist system itself.
In this article, we present a new measurement of the profit rate 
and its determinants in the U.S. economy over the period 1869­
2000 that takes into account the effect of taxation costs. We find 
that four long waves in the movement of the profit rate can be 
identified, each lasting about 40 years. Both the profit rate and the 
profit share had tended to fall from the first to the third long wave 
and the rising taxation costs had been the primary factor behind 
the decline of the profit rate and the profit share.
In this context, neoliberalism (as a set of policies and institu­
tions designed to reduce the degrees of state intervention and un­
dermine the bargaining power of the working class by attacking 
social and economic rights) may be seen as a strategic attempt 
waged by the ruling elite of the system to reverse the secular trends 
of rising wage costs and taxation costs and restore the profit share 
and the profit rate.
Indeed, the fourth, neoliberal long wave has witnessed some 
decline of the taxation costs relative to output and a partial recov­
ery of the profit rate and the profit share. However, neoliberalism 
has achieved only limited success in reducing costs and restoring 
profitability. Compared to earlier historical periods, both the wage 
costs and the taxation costs have stayed at relatively high levels.
Some interesting questions can be raised. Do the limited de­
cline of the taxation costs and the partial recovery of the profit rate 
in the neoliberal era represent a fundamental break from the long­
term historical trend towards increasing state intervention and 
higher taxation costs? Or, is the neoliberal era no more than an his­
torical aberration and the long-term historical trend will reassert 
itself in the post-neoliberal era? Alternatively, Wallerstein suggests
N E O L IB E R A L IS M  A N D  T H E  C O S T  O F  T H E  S T A T E
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that capitalism has entered into a structural crisis that can no long­
er be resolved within the framework of the existing world-system. 
In that case, the neoliberal attack on the state, an institution that 
has played a crucial role in alleviating capitalist social and econom­
ic contradictions, may turn out to be the signal that capitalism has 
exhausted its historical space of self-adjustment, as its primary 
means of self-adjustment (growing state intervention) imposes 
growing costs on the operation of the system.
Figure 6 presents the actual and projected U.S. government to­
tal receipts, total expenditures, and balances as a share of GDP 
from 1929 to 2040. Both the receipts and the expenditures had 
steadily increased from the 1930’s to the 1980’s. In the neoliberal 
era, U.S. government expenditures have stayed at between 30-35%  
of GDP, or historically high levels. Therefore, the neoliberal state 
continues to face high demands from capital, labor, and other so­
cial groups and has largely been unable to reduce the level of 
spending.
With government spending staying at historically high levels, 
the neoliberal effort to reduce taxation costs for the capitalists has 
produced a chronic fiscal crisis. The U.S. government ran large 
deficits (around 5% of GDP) through the 1980’s. Under the Clin­
ton administration, the government balance moved into a small 
surplus towards the end of the 1990’s as the U.S. economy boomed 
in the stock market bubble. However, after the burst of the bubble, 
the Bush administration cut taxes to reward big capitalists and pre­
vent the economy from falling into depression. Military and secu­
rity expenditures increased to finance new imperialist adventures. 
As a result, the U.S. government balance moved swiftly back to a 
deficit that rose to near 5% of GDP by 2003. The United States also 
faces long-term structural fiscal challenges. If the government’s 
current social commitments remain intact (mainly social security 
and medical care commitments) and taxation levels are not raised, 
the U.S. government deficit is projected to explode after 2010.4
4 U.S. government total receipts and expenditures from 1929 to 2003 are from 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2005: table 3.1, wvvw.bea.gov). The projections 
of the U.S. federal government receipts and expenditures after 2004 are based on the 
do nothing” scenario projected by the U.S. congressional budget office, cited in 
Peterson (2004: 235-39). The state and local government receipts and expenditures as 
a share of GDP in the post-2004 years are assumed to be the same as their average in 
the period 1993-2003.
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Figure 6
U.S. Government Receipts, Expenditures, and Balances as a 
Share of GDP 1929-2040  
(actual and projection, all levels of government)
The U.S. government’s chronic fiscal crisis suggests that neolib­
eralism has failed to provide a long-term, sustainable solution to 
the problem of rising taxation costs. The effort to reduce taxation 
costs for the capitalists despite high demands on state resources 
has produced large and rising government deficits in relation to 
national output, a situation that cannot be sustained in the long 
run. If the ruling elites respond to the growing fiscal problem by 
further attacking the working class and greatly reducing state 
spending, it may greatly undermine the state’s legitimacy as well as 
its ability to alleviate capitalist economic and social contradictions. 
To the extent that extensive state intervention has become indis­
pensable for the successful operation of modern capitalism, such a 
strategy may turn out to be self-defeating. Alternatively, if the state 
raises taxes to meet the rising social demands, the rising taxation 
costs could impose an unbearable burden on profitability.0
5 For more analysis on the contradictions of neoliberalism and the developing 
U.S. economic crisis, see Li (2004a; 2004b).
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In the coming decades, the existing social system will have to 
confront the developing global environmental crisis. The endless 
drive towards capital accumulation on a global scale has imposed in­
creasingly severe burdens on the earth’s biosphere and now threat­
ens to produce catastrophic consequences in the not so distant fu­
ture (SDIS, 1999a; 1999b; Foster, 2002). Any attempt to improve 
environmental sustainability involves additional costs for the system, 
so long as it requires some investment or the use of some technol­
ogy that otherwise would not have been undertaken or developed. 
The costs may be directly imposed on the capitalists as a result of 
state regulation or indirectly imposed on the capitalists as a result of 
higher taxes reqLiired to finance government spending on environ­
mental cleaning, investment, and regulation. Given the scope and 
scale of the current environmental problems, the overall costs could 
be financially overwhelming.
Our study in this article is limited to the presentation and analy­
sis of empirical data found in the context of U.S. capitalism. As 
such, it represents a small and limited step in the study of the his­
torical trends of capitalism. More studies using data from other 
countries and other historical periods will be required to under­
stand the changing role of the state and its effects on the profit 
rate. However, we have some confidence that some of the trends 
discussed in this article, such as the long-term tendency of rising 
taxation costs relative to output, may not be the unique phenome­
non of U.S. capitalism. It is a well-established empirical fact that 
government spending as a share of GDP has increased substantially 
across advanced capitalist countries since the late nineteenth cen­
tury and has stayed at historically high levels in the neoliberal era 
(Baker, Epstein & Pollin, 1998: 16).
If neoliberalism or post-neoliberal capitalism fails to substan­
tially reduce the high level of wage and taxation costs and has to 
come to terms with the increasingly expensive environmental costs, 
the system will find itself under enormous and growing pressures. 
Its very survival will be at stake.
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APPENDIX —  * ■
DATA SOURCE AND CONSTRUCTION , 
Calculating the Profit Rate and the Profit Share
The Rate of profit is given by the following equation: r
P /K  = (P /Y ) * (Y/K ) : ' ' " ^
Where P = profit, Y = output, K = Capital Stock and P /Y  represents 
the profit share, Y /K  the output-capital ration. >
Profit is further determined using a subtraction method where
P = Y -  (Wage Costs + Taxation Costs) ■ < .
Wage Costs = Compensation of employees + Wage component of 
the proprietors' income ,
Taxation Costs = Indirect taxes less subsidies + corporate income 
tax + business transfer to the government
Wage component of the proprietors’ income = the proprietors’ in­
come -  the estimated profit component of the proprietors’ income
Estimating the Profit Component in the Proprietors’ Sector j
The proprietors’ sector includes simple commodity producers 
(the self-employed) as well as small capitalist firms. Therefore, the 
proprietors’ income includes labor incomes as well as capitalist 
profits that are not disaggregated through the national accounting 
statistics. Wolff assumes that 50% of the proprietors’ income as 
profits but notes that experimentation of the ratio between one- 
quarter to three-quarter does not alter his results dramatically 
(1999).
Since capitalist relations of production are based on the em­
ployment of wage labor, we assume that the profit component of 
the proprietors’ income is proportional to the compensation of 
employees in the proprietors’ sector. Further, we assume that the 
ratio of profit to compensation of employees is the same in the 
proprietors’ sector as that in the corporate sector. This results in a 
much low^ er share of profit component than what is often assumed 
(12% for 1997). However, since the proprietor’s income has tended 
to fall as a share of the national output, a higher estimate of the
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profit component would have resulted in a stronger trend for the 
profit share to fall than is presented in this article.
The measurement of P, Y, and K has been undertaken using 
the following variables:
Variables from BEA National Income and Product Account 
(NIPA) Tables, 2004
The following variables have been taken from NIPA Tables 
2004. The table series number is given followed by the line number 
in parentheses. The column on the right gives the abbreviation 
used in the calculations below:
V ariable R elevant N IPA  T able A bbreviation
Net Domestic Product 1.7.5(30) BEANNP
Net Stock of Private Non-Residential 4.1(1) BEAK
Fixed Assets (current prices)
Total Compensation of Employees 1.12(2) BEATOTW
Proprietor’s Income 1.12(9) BEAPROP1NC
Corporate Profits with IVA and CCA 1.12(13) BEAP
Indirect Taxes 1.12(19) BEATAX1
Corporate Income Tax 1.12(14) BEATAX2
Corporate Business Transfers to 1.12(23) BEATAX3
Government
Compensation of Employees in 1.15(13)* BEAPROPW
Proprietorships and Partnerships
Compensation of Employees in the 1.15 (4)* BEACORPW
Corporate Business Sector
*NIPA Series, 1997
Variables from the Dumenil and Levy Series
Private Sector Net National Dumenil & Levy, 1993: 354-61 DLNNP
Product
Private Sector Total Wage Derived from Dumenil & Levy, 1993: DLPSW
354-61, (wage * total hours worked)
Private Sector Capital Stock Dumenil & Levy, 1993: 354-61 DLPSK
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Variables from the Historical Statistics of the United States
Nei National Product






Share of Unincorporated Income (Proprietor’s in F 186-191 1ISSPI
come) in National Income 
Corporate Income Tax Y358-373 HSTAX1
Data Source and Construction for Different Historical Periods
1929-2000 ............
Y = Output = BEANNP ^
K = Capital Stock = BEAK
Wage Costs = BEATOTW + BEAPROPINC -  Profit Component in 
Proprietor’s Income
Where, Profit Component in Proprietor’s Income = BEAPROPW * 
BEAP/BEACORPW
Hence Wage Costs = BEATOTW + BEAPROPINC -  (BEAPROPW * 
BEAP/BEACORPW) ,
Taxation Costs = BEATAX1 + BEATAX2 + BEATAX3
Therefore, Profit = Output -  (Wage + Taxation costs) = BEANNP -  
(W+T) , . '
= BEANNP -  [BEATOTW + BEAPROPINC -  (BEAPROPW * 
BEAP /  BEACORPW) + BEATAX1 + BEATAX2 + BEATAX3]
Pre-1929
For 1919-28 Y = Output = net national product or NNP (series F6- 
9, BEA Historical Statistics) ,
For 1917-18 Y = NNP $63.3 billion (derived from series F6-9, BEA 
Historical Statistics)
Output:
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For 1897-1916 individual annual NNP has been estimated using 
the following formula:
NNP = Dumenil and Levy Private Sector NNP * (BEA 5-year 
average of NNP /  D&L 5-year average of Private Sector NNP), 
with 1917-18 using two-year average (Dumenil & Levy, 1993).
For 1869-96, the NNP (y) for 1897-1929 was regressed on D&L 
private NNP (x) using the formula: ln(y) = a + b*ln(x). The esti­
mated coefficients were then used with D&L private NNP for 
1869-96 to estimate BEANNP.
Wage Costs:
For 1900-28, the share of wage costs in national income has been 
derived using the following formula:
Share of wage costs in national income = compensation share + 
unincorporated income share * 80%
These are denoted as BEA average wage shares.
The share of D&L private sector total wage in national income for 
each year between 1900-28 was calculated. From these figures, the 
five-year averages of D&L total wage share (four year average for 
1925-28) were determined. These are denoted as D&L average 
wage shares.
Wages costs for each individual year between 1897-1928 were es­
timated using the following formula:
Wage costs = D&L private sector total wage X (BEA average 
wage share /  D&L average wage share)
For 1897-99, the ratio of BEA average wage share over D&L aver­
age wage share was assumed to be the same as for 1900-04.
For 1869-96, the wage costs (1897-1928) (y) were regressed on 
D&L private sector wage (1897-1928) (x) using the following for­
mula: ln(y) = a + b*ln(x). The estimated costs were then used with 
D&L private sector wage (1869-96) to estimate the wage costs.
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Taxation Costs: • ■ : ■ ■ . .  • ■ •. - • -y ^
Taxation costs for 1897-1928 were determined using the following 
formula:
Taxation cost = indirect taxes less subsidies + corporate income 
tax = net national product -  national income + corporate in­
come tax (corporate income tax figures from Historical Statis­
tics Series Y 358-73 with other years assumed to be zero).
For 1869-96, the taxation costs (y) for 1897-1928 were re­
gressed on the net national product (x) using the following 
formula ln(y) = a+ b*ln(x). The estimated coefficients were then 
used with the net national product for 1869-96 to estimate the 
taxation costs.
The sum of wage and taxation costs for 1869-1929 were then de­
termined.
Profit was determined in the usual manner, as P = output -  (sum of 
wage and taxation costs).
Capital Stock: ;
For 1925-2000, K = Capital Stock = BEAK
For 1869-1924, the BEA series of net stock of private nonresiden- 
tial fixed assets (y) were regressed on D&L net private capital stock 
series (x) for 1925-89 using ln(y) = a + b*ln(x). The estimated coef­
ficients were then used with D&L net private capital stock series 
for 1869-1924 to estimate the net stock of private capital compati­
ble with the post-1925 BEA series.
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